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As the electorate ages, intergenerational inequality grows. Craig Berry explains that young
people are in some ways being ‘out-voted’ by older cohorts, a problem that will only get worse
and may undermine the legitimacy of representative democracy itself.
Young people are more af f ected by the outcomes of  the democratic process than other
cohorts; their youth means that by and large they will live with the consequences of  polit ical
decisions f or longer. Furthermore, young people are at a crucial lif e-stage – undertaking
education and training, embarking on careers, f orming f amilies – where the impact of  polit ical decisions
will have a decisive and cumulative ef f ect on their socio-economic circumstances and lif e chances across
their lif ecourses. The growing power of  ‘the grey vote’ appears to have had real consequences f or the
ability of  young people to make themselves heard within the democratic process, but more worryingly,
may begin to undermine the legit imacy of  democracy itself .
Simply, cohort size matters. Analysis of  the Brit ish Election Survey by Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel
shows that generations tend to be self ish when they get to the ballot box. That generations can act,
more or less coherently, to bring about change in social structures was a proposition f irst put f orward by
Karl Mannheim in 1923. Mannheim, one of  the f ounding f athers of  modern sociology, believed that
generational change was one of  the main driving f orces of  polit ical change.
Strangely, this key precept of  the discipline of  sociology seems to have been largely overlooked by the
study of  democracy by polit ical scientists. Clearly, this does not mean that lif e-stage or generational
identity determines voting behaviour; intergenerational solidarity is evident across many areas, and there
are many f orms of  polit ical inequality and many determinants of  people’s polit ical pref erences. But age is
nevertheless a relevant f actor; that young people are in some ways being ‘out-voted’ by older cohorts
should theref ore be a matter f or concern.
At the 2010 general election, 40-somethings were dominant at the ballot box. The youngest voters, and
voters in their early-30s, were particularly disadvantaged. But the voting power of  people approaching
retirement, whose lif e chances will be af f ected by electoral outcomes to a f ar lesser extent than younger
voters, was also highly signif icant. There were more voters aged 50, 51, 52 or 63 than any single age
between 31 and 36, more voters aged 62 than any single age between 32 and 35, and more voters aged
50, 51 or 63 than aged 18.
This inequality will accelerate in coming decades. Due to increasing survival rates, and the ageing of  the
members of  the large baby booms of  the immediate post-war era, the overriding trend is towards an
older electorate, with greater concentrations of  potential voting power among people in their 50s and
60s. There will be only 708,000 18 year-old potential voters, and 702,000 19 year-old potential voters
(compared to a single-year age cohort average size of  902,000 f or 50-somethings) – single-year cohort
sizes across the age distribution will not drop below this level until age 65.
Thirty years later, in 2051, there will be a particularly powerf ul set of  cohorts aged around 60. The
average single-year cohort size f or people aged 58-62 will be 937,000, yet there will be only 825,000 18
year-old voters, and no smaller cohort up to age 68. The median potential voter was 46 in 2010. In 2021
this will rise to 47. The median potential voter will be aged 50 by 2041, and 51 in 2051. It is worth
reiterating that this is a relatively recent phenomenon, or more accurately, one we are yet to f ully
experience. The median potential voter in 1981 was already aged 46; this f ell to actually f ell 44 in the ten
years to 1991, bef ore rising to 45 in 2001.
Taking voter turnout rates into account shows that the democratic process was even more skewed
towards older cohorts. The median ‘actual’ voter was aged 49 in 2010, three years older than the median
‘potential’ voter. The median actual voter will be 52 by 2021, rising to 54 by 2051. At the 2010 general
election, 40-somethings were largely successf ul in converting their potential voting power into actual
power. But older cohorts had closed the gap signif icantly. Excluding 40-somethings, there were more
actual voters aged 63 than any other age. Given their lower propensity to vote, 18 year-olds exercised
less actual voting power at the 2010 general election than 73 year-olds. 45 year-olds exercised 84 per
cent more actual voting power than 18-year olds, and 50 year-olds exercised 62 per cent more.
In 2021, 18-year olds will exercise less actual voting power than 79 year-olds. 50 year-olds will exercise
97 per cent more power than 18 year-olds, 55 year-olds will exercise more than double (115 per cent) the
power, and 60 year-olds will exercise 95 per cent more. In 2031, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual
power than 84 year-olds. By 2051, if  turnout rates persist, 18 year-olds will exercise less actual power
than a typical single-year cohort in their late-80s. (The f ull results of  this research are available f rom the
Intergenerational Foundation website.)
These inequalit ies do not mean, in any straightf orward sense, that young people’s vote should
somehow be worth more. Democracy’s f irst principle is, and must remain, ‘one person, one vote’.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to use the disenf ranchisement of  young people as an excuse to continue
neglecting the many avoidable problems that blight the lives of  the ‘oldest old’, such as poverty, isolation
and the creaking care system. But that representative democracies with near-universal f ranchises have
only ever existed within populations with pyramid-shaped age distributions may be one of  the hidden
f oundations of  representative democracy. Representative democracy without this demographic bias
towards young people is entirely untried – it is into this uncharted territory that we are heading at a rapid
pace.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
 
About the author
Dr Craig Berry is a Lecturer at the University of  Warwick and a f reelance public policy researcher. He
worked previously as Head of  Policy at the International Longevity Centre and as a Policy Advisor on
Older People and State Pensions at HM Treasury. He conducts research into the economic implications
of  population ageing, f ocusing on pensions, f iscal policy, and social care. He completed his PhD, on
globalisation and UK trade policy-making, at the University of  Shef f ield in 2008.
You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. Democratic polit ics matters – it can and does shape our lives posit ively. Although it is imperf ect,
the alternatives are unthinkable. (15.7)
2. Institutional democracy will strengthen our society, engaging cit izenry and distributing power
equitably (13.4)
3. Book Review: Electronic Elections: The Perils and Promises of  Digital Democracy (13.3)
4. Book Review: The Secret History of  Democracy (13)
